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Accountants' Liability After Bily v.
Arthur Young & Co.: A More
Equitable Proposal for Third Party
Recovery
by
THOMAS G. MACKEY*
Introduction
When an accountant' is negligent in conducting an audit of a cor-
poration's financial statements, investors who rely on the audit may
incur losses. The question of whether or under what circumstances an
investor may recover from the accountant is a source of continuing
controversy. This question arises when an accountant negligently is-
sues an opinion about the accuracy of a business's financial state-
ments. Investors and creditors who sustain losses when the business
fails often attempt to recover from the accountant under negligence
theories.
Recently, in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,2 the California Supreme
Court placed severe restrictions on investors seeking to recover for an
accountant's negligence. Under prior California law, such third par-
ties could recover if they showed that it was reasonably foreseeable to
the accountant that they would rely on the opinion. 3 After Bily, third
parties must show that the accountant actually foresaw that they
would rely on the opinion.4 This change from objective to subjective
foreseeability effectively forecloses large numbers of third parties who
* J.D. Candidate, 1994; B.S. 1991, California State University, Northridge. I would
like to thank my brother John for providing me with valuable insights into the accounting
industry. I am also greatly appreciative of those who participated in the editing and pro-
duction of this Note.
1. This Note focuses on the accountant's function of auditing the financial state-
ments of business entities. Therefore, the terms "auditor" and "accountant" will be used
interchangeably to describe the professionals who perform this function. In addition, the
term "Certified Public Accountant" (CPA) may be used from time to time to refer to
accountants who are licensed to conduct audits and issue opinions.
2. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
3. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
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actually relied on the audit from recovering damages for the account-
ant's negligence.
The question of accountant liability to third parties was first ad-
dressed in 1931 by Judge Benjamin Cardozo in his famous opinion
Ultramares v. Touche.5 The Ultramares decision established a require-
ment of contractual privity between an accountant and a party suing
for negligence. Because the services of an accountant are procured
and paid for by the business being audited, injured investors and cred-
itors of the business, who are not in contractual privity with the audi-
tor, are barred under Ultramares from suing the accountant to recover
their losses.
Major changes have occurred in the business world since Cardozo
penned the Ultramares opinion. These changes have altered the ac-
countant's relationship with corporations, investors, creditors, and the
government. The "unqualified opinion," an auditor's statement that a
business's financial statements conform to accounting industry stan-
dards,6 has become a prerequisite for any firm to borrow money, ob-
tain government approval to raise funds in the capital markets, or
attract investors who are willing to fund the firm's activities.7 The au-
ditor's opinion has served to streamline the allocation of resources by
reducing the risks, and therefore costs, of investing in business
ventures. 8
These changes in the business world have also altered the ac-
countant's role. The importance of reliance on unqualified opinions
places the accountant between those businesses that pay for the ac-
countant's work and the third parties who rely on the accountant's
audit.9 While the auditor's paying client is the business whose finan-
cial data is to be analyzed, the accountant's service is critical to a wide
variety of parties, all of whom are concerned with whether the data
represents a true and accurate statement of the business's financial
5. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, J.).
6. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), a national pro-
fessional organization comprised of state-certified accountants, promulgates rules gov-
erning the proper preparation of financial statements and guidelines to be followed in
testing the level of adherence to these rules. Willis W. Hagen III, Certified Public Account-
ants' Liability for Malpractice: Effect of Compliance with GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CoN-
TEMP. L. 65, 72-73 (1987).
7. See Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-
Party Liability of Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1309, 1333 (1991).
8. See Howard B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant
for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 250 (1983).
9. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 150 (N.J. 1983).
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condition.' 0 When an audit is negligently performed, all parties who
have relied on the financial statements of the business find their in-
vestments imperiled. Because reliance by third parties sometimes re-
sults in injury, differing views have emerged and many jurisdictions
have allowed third parties, subject to varying requirements, to recover
from accountants despite the lack of a contractual relationship. What
happens when these third parties actually incur losses is the subject of
this Note.
This Note examines the extent to which reliance on an auditor's
representations creates a duty owed by the accountant to the relying
third party. Generally, three approaches govern the scope of the duty
owed by an accountant to a third party. First, the privity standard
enunciated in Ultramares requires contractual privity or its close
equivalent; foreseeability does not create a duty on the accountant."
The second approach is based upon negligent misrepresentation as de-
fined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' 2 Jurisdictions applying
this approach expand the accountant's duty to include a limited group
of third parties who the accountant anticipated would rely upon her
audit, and who actually engage in the type of transactions that the
auditor specifically anticipated. Although foreseeability defines the
group to which an accountant may be liable, the group is restricted to
those third parties actually foreseen by the accountant. The third ap-
proach is a true reasonable foreseeability standard.13 In contrast to
the negligent misrepresentation approach, under this standard a third
party is owed a duty by the accountant under the common-law notion
of reasonable foreseeability. Whereas the negligent misrepresentation
theory requires that the accountant actually foresee the reliance by
the third party, the reasonable foreseeability standard looks to
whether the accountant should have foreseen the reliance.
In a 1986 court of appeal decision,' 4 California embraced the
third approach-reasonable foreseeability. This approach was viewed
as comporting with the common law of California relating to negli-
gence and duty.'5 However, in the summer of 1992, in Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co.,16 the California Supreme Court discarded this approach
in favor of a new standard that incorporates the privity and Restate-
10. See Mark D. Boveri & Brent E. Marshall, Recent Decision: Tort Law-The En-
larging Scope of Auditors' Liability to Relying Third Parties, 59 No=E DAME L. REV. 281,
292 (1983).
11. See infra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
14. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr.
218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
15. Id. at 226.
16. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
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ment approaches. The net effect of Bily is a drastic reduction in the
availability of any remedy for injured investors, creditors, and other
third parties against negligent accountants.
Part I of this Note reviews the evolving, or perhaps regressing,
view of the accountant's duty to third parties, particularly in Califor-
nia. Part II examines the public policy rationales set forth by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court as justifications for its decision in Bily. It
concludes that these rationales are insufficient to justify the "whole-
sale curtailment of legal duty"'17 that shields accountants from liability
to those who justifiably relied upon their work.
Part III of this Note proposes that a more reasonable alternative
to the new California rule would be to adopt proportional liability to
determine damages in accountant's liability lawsuits. By discarding
joint and several liability in favor of proportional liability, the threat
of unlimited liability, which distressed the Court in Bily, would be sub-
stantially reduced. 18 Resumption of the reasonable foreseeability
standard along with the adoption of proportional liability would allow
deserving third parties to recover a portion of their losses from negli-
gent accountants, while slowing down the freight train of liability suits
that threatens accounting firms in the 1990s.
IL The Development of Alternative Approaches to the
Accountant's Duty to Third Parties
A major function of CPAs is to provide an external evaluation of
the accuracy of the financial statements produced by their clients.19
The result of the accountant's evaluation is a written opinion discuss-
ing whether the financial statements of the audited entity conform to
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).20 When the au-
ditor finds that the statements conform to GAAP, the auditor issues
an unqualified opinion. An unqualified opinion represents that the
financial statements conform with GAAP and "present fairly in all
material respects the ... changes in financial position of the client in
17. Id. at 775 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 763.
19. See T.J. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties,
28 VAND. L. REV. 31, 35 (1975). For an explanation of the audit function and the industry
standards that govern it, see Bily, 834 P.2d at 748-51.
20. GAAP are principles of accounting technique established by the AICPA. GAAP
includes guidelines for accountants to follow when developing financial statements. The
guidelines discuss the recording of assets and liabilities, changes in assets and liabilities,
disclosure of pertinent information, and appropriate preparation of financial statements in
various situations. See 3 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AC § 1026.01 (1979); see also
Bily, 834 P.2d at 750 (discussing scope of defendant's "unqualified audit" of Osborne Com-
puter Corp.); Wiener, supra note 8 , at 237-39.
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the relevant periods. '21 Alternatively, an accountant may issue either
a "qualified opinion,"22 or an "adverse opinion." 2  These latter two
opinions reduce the credibility of the audited entity in the eyes of in-
vestors, creditors, and others considering doing business with the
entity.
In the early stages of the accounting industry, such "audits" were
conducted primarily for the purposes of assuring the owner of a busi-
ness that its financial status was accurately represented and that the
employees of the business were not defrauding the owner.24 Today,
however, the business environment has changed such that the audit
opinion serves a much greater purpose than simply providing the cli-
ent with the comfort of knowing all is well.25 Businesses that expect
to thrive and grow in today's market must be able to demonstrate to a
wide variety of outsiders that their reported financial condition is true
and accurate.26 Universally, creditors who contemplate loaning
money to a business entity require audited financial statements.27 In
order to issue new securities, and thus raise capital for business opera-
tions, federal law requires that corporations maintain audited financial
statements.28 The audit is perhaps most important to the stockholders
of the modern corporation. Just as early owners of businesses needed
to be assured that their employees were not defrauding them, share-
holders need the ability to monitor the executives and managers who
safeguard their property, and the audit gives shareholders that ability.
The work of accountants in modern society is relied on by large
numbers of individuals and businesses other than the client.29 Thus,
when an accountant is negligent in the performance of auditing serv-
ices, many third parties may be injured. Despite the danger of injury,
courts have historically felt constrained to limit accountant liability for
these injuries.
21. Bily, 834 P.2d at 750; see also Hagen, supra note 6, at 69-70.
22. Hagen, supra note 6, at 70-71.
23. An adverse opinion, the direct opposite of an unqualified opinion, states that the
financial statements have not been prepared in sufficient accordance with GAAP and do
not fairly represent the financial condition of the audited entity. Ild.
24. Wiener, supra note 8, at 250.
25. See G. Stephen Diab, Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland: Ac-
countants' Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1459,
1459 (1989); Robert E. Pace, Note, Negligent Misrepresentation and the Certified Public
Accountant: An Overview of Common Law Liability to Third Parties, 18 SUFFOLK U. L.
Rv. 431, 431 (1984).
26. Wiener, supra note 8, at 250.
27. See, eg., Rusch Factors v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 86 (D.R.I. 1968) (holding that
pecuniary loss resulting from reliance on fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation is not
an injury to the person).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa (sched. A, § 25) (1988).
29. See Samuel S. Paschall, Liability to Non-Clients: The Accountant's Role and Re-
sponsibility, 53 Mo. L. RPv. 693, 722-23 (1988).
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A. Ultramares and the Privity Requirement
The first case to address the problem of accountant liability to
third parties was Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.30 In that case, Touche,
Niven & Company (Touche),31 a CPA firm, was employed by Fred
Stern & Company (Stern) for the purposes of preparing and certifying
a balance sheet.32 Touche prepared the balance sheet and attested to
its accuracy. 33 Touche knew that Stern relied upon credit in order to
operate its business, and that Stern would show the balance sheet to
banks, lenders, stockholders, and other third parties.34 After receiving
a copy of the certified balance sheet, Ultramares Corporation ex-
tended a loan to Stern.35 Subsequently, Stern went bankrupt.3 6 Ul-
tra'nares then sued Touche, alleging both negligence and fraud in the
preparation of the balance sheet.37
The case eventually reached the New York Court of Appeals,
where Judge Cardozo wrote that if an accountant is negligent "the
ensuing liability.., is one that is bounded by the contract, and is to be
enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been made. '38
However, in order to comport with one of his earlier decisions,39 Car-
dozo was forced to enlarge the notion of contractual privity to allow
recovery by a third party for whose primary benefit the accountant
performed the audit. Barring a clear showing that the third party's
benefit was not the "end and aim of the transaction," however, only
the auditor's client could recover. 40 The end result was that while the
court felt there was evidence of Touche's negligence, 41 Ultramares
could not recover from Touche under a negligence theory because Ul-
30. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, J.).
31. Touche, Niven & Company, now called Deloitte & Touche, is one of the largest
accounting firms in the United States and is a member of the "Big Six" accounting firms.
The other "Big Six" accounting firms are Arthur Andersen & Co., Ernst & Young, Price
Waterhouse, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Coopers & Lybrand.
32. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 442.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 443.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 442-43.
38. Id. at 448.
39. In Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922), a public weigher contracted with
a bean seller to certify the weight of bags of beans. When the purchasers of the beans
found that the weights were inaccurate they sued the public weigher. Judge Cardozo held
that the weigher could be liable to the buyers. Id. at 275. A distinction made clear in
Ultramares is that the seller of the beans had directed the weigher to supply the buyer with
a copy of the weight certification, and thus "the transmission of the certificate... was not
merely one possibility among many, but the 'end and aim of the transaction."' Ultramares,
174 N.E. at 445.
40. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 445.
41. Id. at 443-44.
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tramares did not contract directly with Touche to audit Stem's
books.42
Thus, the Ultramares decision established the privity requirement
in accountants' negligence actions. The primary motivation for estab-
lishing the restrictive standard was a desire to protect accountants,
who otherwise may be exposed to "liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 43
In 1985, the New York Court of Appeals issued an opinion reaf-
firming, but modifying, Ultramares. In Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co.,44 the court established a three-prong test for deter-
mining when a third party not in privity with an accountant may nev-
ertheless recover from that accountant. The court instructed:
Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncontrac-
tual parties who rely to their detriment on inaccurate financial re-
ports, certain prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the accountants
must have been aware that the financial reports were to be used for
a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of which a
known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3) there must
have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them
to that party or parties, which evinces the accountant's understand-
ing of that party or parties' reliance.45
The Ultramares privity requirement, as modified in Credit Alliance, is
the current state of New York's law regarding the accountant's duty to
third parties. A large number of states have followed Ultramares,
making it the majority view today.46
B. The Restatement Approach
Some courts, finding the privity approach followed in New York
to be unduly restrictive, have looked to the definition of negligent
42. The court found that causes of action would lie, however, for fraud or intentional
or reckless misrepresentation. Id. at 444.
43. Id. In the decision, Judge Cardozo seemed concerned with protecting the ac-
counting profession, which was still in its infancy. One commentator has noted that, given
the wealth and power of the industry today, the decision has far exceeded that objective.
See Paschall, supra note 29, at 714.
44. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
45. Id. at 118. An obvious example of "linking conduct" sufficient to satisfy the third
prong would be the accountant personally contacting the third party during the course of
the audit, or delivering a copy of the audit directly to the third party. In New York, this
requirement seems to be more difficult to fulfill in light of the recent court of appeals
decision, Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d
1080 (N.Y. 1992). In Security Pacific, the court held that although the third party plaintiff
alleged that it directly communicated with the auditor and received general assurances
from the partner in charge of the audit, there was insufficient pleading to satisfy the linking
conduct requirement. Id. at 1085-86.
46. Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountants' Liability, 1988
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 213, 218-19.
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misrepresentation in the Restatement (Second) of Torts47 for a
slightly more inclusive standard.48 The key feature of this approach is
that the duty to third parties is expanded to include a class of persons
whom the accountant intended would rely on the audit.49 Under this
approach, liability extends to transactions in which the auditor in-
tended to influence a third party or knew that the client intended to
influence a specific third party.5 0 In other words, the extension of the
accountant's duty is to a class of persons actually foreseen as well as
individuals specifically foreseen.5 1
North Carolina recently joined the growing number of jurisdic-
tions that adhere to the Restatement approach. In Raritan River Steel
Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland5 2 two plaintiffs who had extended
credit to Intercontinental Metals Corporation alleged damages for
their reliance on a negligently prepared audit. One plaintiff had relied
on a net worth figure in a report published by Dun & Bradstreet.5 3
However, this plaintiff's claim was dismissed quickly because there
was no showing of direct reliance upon the financial statements au-
dited by the accountant.5 4 The other plaintiff claimed reliance on the
financial statements themselves.5 5 The court found direct reliance as
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
48. The negligent misrepresentation test was introduced in Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-93 (D.R.I. 1968), and has been adopted by the majority of courts
which have considered the issue since that time. See First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v.
Monco Agency, 911 F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1990); Ingram Indus. v. Nowicki, 527 F.
Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Ky. 1981); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198, 199-200 (Ga.
1987); Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178, 179-82 (Iowa 1988); Law Offices of
Lawrence J. Stockier v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 81-82 (Mich. 1989); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248
N.W.2d 291, 298-303 (Minn. 1976); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland,
367 S.E.2d 609, 615-18 (N.C. 1988); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co. 451 A.2d 1308,
1310-13 (N.H. 1982); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212,214-15
(Ohio 1982); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974); First Nat'l Bank
v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W. Va. 1989); see also Gossman, supra note 46, at 218-19.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (1977).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(b) (1977).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 5-7 (1977). A troubling
limitation is explained in the illustrations of the Restatement. If an accountant is aware
that a specific bank will use the audit in determining whether to extend credit, but in the
end a different bank uses the audit for the very same purpose, then the bank which actually
relies will not be able to recover from the accountant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 5. The second bank, acting in the same capacity and manner as
the first, is foreclosed from recovering. Thus, despite the fact that the accountant foresaw
reliance by a bank, and that a bank actually relied, the mere substitution of the banks
prohibits any recovery. See John W. Bagby & John C. Ruhnka, The Controversy Over
Third Party Rights: Toward More Predictable Parameters of Auditor Liability, 22 GA. L.
REv. 149, 164-65 (1987).
52. 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988).
53. Id. at 612.
54. Id. at 613.
55. Id.
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to this plaintiff and proceeded to address whether a duty was owed to
the plaintiff by the accountant.5 6
The North Carolina court rejected the Ultramares approach as
too restrictive, and adopted the Restatement standard holding that
the right to recover against an accountant should extend to any "per-
son, or one of a group of persons, whom the accountant or his client
intends the information to benefit." 57 The court also instructed that if
the benefit is intended by the client, then the accountant must have
actual knowledge of the client's intent at the time the accountant con-
ducts the audit or prepares the opinion.5 8
The court in Raritan believed that adoption of the Restatement
approach would strike a balance between "the need to hold account-
ants to a standard that accounts for their contemporary role in the
financial world with the need to protect them from liability that unrea-
sonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking. ' 59 Indeed, this
desire to hold accountants accountable has been a common theme
among courts and jurisdictions that have rejected the Ultramares doc-
trine. The Ohio Supreme Court, in adopting the Restatement ap-
proach, complained that the privity rule "ignores the modem verity
that accountants make reports on which people other than their cli-
ents foreseeably rely in the ordinary course of business. '60 Despite
complaints that the Ultramares approach is too restrictive, the Re-
statement approach retains considerable restrictions and similarly lim-
its the class of third parties who may recover because the accountant
must have actually foreseen that the complaining third party would
rely.
C. The Reasonable Foreseeability Approach
A few jurisdictions have found the restrictions of the Restate-
ment approach unnecessary and have chosen to analyze accountant
liability to third parties under common-law foreseeability analysis.
This approach examines the reasonable foreseeability of the harm
done to the third party. Jurisdictions adopting this view have carried
the reasoning of the Restatement approach to its logical conclusion.
These jurisdictions adopted this approach by reasoning that if ac-
countants truly have such an important role in the financial commu-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 614.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 617.
60. Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ohio 1982).
Here, the limited partners in a partnership that was audited by Coopers & Lybrand sued
the accountants for professional negligence. The court found that the limited partners be-
longed to a limited group whose reliance on the accountants' representations was specifi-
cally foreseen. IL at 215.
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nity, then the artificial privity requirement cannot stand and the
limitations on third party recovery under the Restatement approach
are arbitrary and unnecessary. 61
This approach has garnered the support of many commentators. 62
In 1983, California court of appeal Justice Harold B. Wiener authored
an article in which he called for the demise of the Ultramares doctrine
in favor of the reasonable foreseeability approach.63 Justice Wiener
attacked Ultramares as an "aberration" even at the time it was de-
cided and further asserted that the Restatement view was only a slight
departure from the privity approach. 64 He claimed that both views
ignore the role of accountants in "provid[ing] the lending and invest-
ing public with independent opinions on how fairly financial state-
ments had been made. ' 65 Justice Wiener concluded that the
reasonable foreseeability approach most appropriately recognized the
importance of the accountant's work and allocated financial loss in a
manner fair to both the parties and the market. 66
The New Jersey Supreme Court has endorsed the reasonable
foreseeability approach. In H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,67 plaintiffs
sold their business to Giant Stores Corporation in exchange for com-
mon stock in Giant. The stock turned out to be worthless, and the
plaintiffs sued Touche Ross & Company alleging reliance upon finan-
cial statements audited by Touche Ross.68 In rejecting the Ultramares
doctrine, the court said:
So long as the privity rule is no longer viable in the area of tort
liability there is no reason why a contractor should not have the
same duties toward a stranger to the contract as any member of
society to another, i.e., to exercise due care to avoid injury to an-
other's person or property.69
The court adopted the reasonable foreseeability approach, based on
the abandonment of privity in the general tort doctrine of the state
61. See International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal.
Rptr. 218, 224-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
62. See Albert G. Besser, Privity?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Ac-
countants to Third Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507 (1968); Michael A. Mess, Account-
ants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 838 (1977);
Kenneth Ira Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants' Liability to
the Public, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 56 (1968); Wiener, supra note 8.
63. Wiener, supra note 8.
64. Id. at 248; see also Solomon, supra note 62 (analyzing the Ultramares decision and
discussing factors leading to a determination of privity).
65. Wiener, supra note 8, at 250.
66. Id. at 254-56. The favorable effect on the market would derive from increased
care by accountants in the performance of audits.
67. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
68. Id. at 140.
69. Id. at 144 (quoting Gold Mills, Inc. v. Orbit Processing Corp., 297 A.2d 203 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1972)).
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and on the general recognition that audited financial statements are
largely prepared for third parties not in contractual privity with the
auditor.70
In addition, the court stated that imposing such liability would
improve the accuracy of audits and reduce the necessity for "costly
separate investigations by each party at interest... which are so much
sand in the economic machine."'71 In an effort to ensure that a plain-
tiff actually relied on an accountant's work, however, the court re-
tained the requirement that a third party have received audited
financial statements from either the accountant or the audited entity
for there to be accountant liability.72
Two additional state supreme courts, Wisconsin and Mississippi, 73
have followed the New Jersey Supreme Court's lead. Wisconsin
adopted a version of the reasonable foreseeability test approximately
one month after the Rosenblum decision. In Citizens State Bank v.
Timm, Schmidt & Co.7 4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that ac-
countants would be liable for foreseeable injuries to third parties un-
less public policy reasons dictated otherwise. 75 The court held that
such public policy determinations should be considered by the courts
on a case-by-case basis. This approach brought Wisconsin's treatment
of negligent accounting cases in line with the general tort principles of
the state.76 In Mississippi, the reasonable foreseeability standard was
adopted, including the requirement that a third party request and re-
ceive audited financial statements from the audited entity.
77
D. The State of the Law in California
Prior to the Bily decision, California was among the states adher-
ing to the reasonable foreseeability approach. California had adopted
the reasonable foreseeability standard over the privity standard in a
1986 court of appeal decision, International Mortgage Co. v. John P.
70. Id. at 149.
71. Id. at 150 (quoting In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 671
(1957)).
72. Ia
73. In addition to Wisconsin and Mississippi, Texas has embraced reasonable foresee-
ability through an appellate decision. In Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d
873, 880 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971), the Texas Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement ap-
proach. However, in dicta in a later case, the court expanded the test to include all third
parties of whom an accountant either was or should have been aware. See Blue Bell, Inc.
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
74. 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
75. Id. at 366.
76. Id.
77. Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So.2d 315 (Miss. 1987). In
rejecting the Restatement approach, the court stated that "there is no reason to prefer a
foreseen user over a foreseeable user." Id. at 321.
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Butler Accountancy Corp.78 This measure of a third party's ability to
recover from an accountant was announced as "consistent with the
fundamental principles of California negligence law."'79 The court
traced the demise of the privity requirement in other contexts80 and
concluded that no justification existed for retaining the privity re-
quirement in liability suits against accountants. 81 In so holding, the
court relied on language in United States v. Arthur Andersen,8 2 in
which the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the public re-
sponsibility of CPAs. The court also noted that the accounting indus-
try itself acknowledges its duty to parties other than clients.83
In International Mortgage, the court of appeal addressed concerns
that accountants might become guarantors of their clients' financial
statements under the reasonable foreseeability approach. The court
noted that in an audit opinion accountants were only stating whether
and to what extent a client's financial statements comply with GAAP,
measured through the application of Generally Accepted Accounting
Standards (GAAS). 84 An action for negligence against the account-
ant should depend upon whether the GAAP and GAAS were negli-
gently applied, rather than the ultimate condition of the financial
statements. 85 Limiting the responsibility of the accountant, to deter-
78. 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
79. Id. at 221.
80. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969) (finding attorney who drafted a
will for his client liable to the client's beneficiaries despite the lack of a contractual rela-
tionship with them).
81. International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
82. 465 U.S. 805 (1984). In Arthur Andersen, the Court denied a work product privi-
lege, similar to that afforded attorneys, to accountants for their work papers. Chief Justice
Burger wrote that "the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending
any employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant perform-
ing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stock-
holders, as well as to the investing public." Id. at 817-18.
83. Id. The Court cited the AICPA as acknowledging "the profession's responsibility
to the public, a responsibility that has grown as the number of investors has grown, as the
relationship between corporate managers and stockholders has become more impersonal,
and as government increasingly relies on accounting information." Id. (citing 2 AICPA
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ET § 53.01 (1988)).
84. International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225; see 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STAN-
DARDS AU § 110.01 (1992).
85. Id. In some jurisdictions it is unsettled whether adherence to GAAP and GAAS
is sufficient to absolve an accountant of liability. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that compliance with
GAAP is not determinative of liability under SEC Rule 10b-5), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). Contra Monroe v. Hughes, [1991-92 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,621 (D. Or. Dec. 9, 1991) (holding accountants not negligent
because they complied with the rules of their profession); see also Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co., 834 P.2d 745, 779 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J. dissenting) (arguing that when the cause of
action is based on an opinion which discusses the client's financial records only in terms of
their conformity with GAAP and GAAS, then adherence to those standards should be
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mining whether GAAP and GAAS were complied with, significantly
undercuts the argument that reasonable foreseeability will impose un-
due burdens on auditors.
H. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.: Abandoning Reasonable
Foreseeability in California
International Mortgage was the law in California regarding ac-
countants' liability to third parties for about six years. In 1992, how-
ever, the California Supreme Court swept the decision out the door
with Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,86 returning California to a narrower
view of the accountant's duty. While the Bily court pays lip service to
and incorporates the strict privity requirement into its decision, the
essence of the decision is a version of the Restatement approach.
In Bily, the plaintiffs were investors, ranging from individuals to
pension and venture capital investment funds. Some of the plaintiffs
had purchased stock in the Osborne Computer Company, and others
had purchased warrants entitling them to purchase stock at favorable
prices in a future stock offering. Arthur Young had issued unqualified
opinions for Osborne's financial statements for the two years previous
to the transactions. After the failure of Osborne,87 plaintiffs sued Ar-
thur Young,8 8 asserting that they had relied on its accountants' opin-
ions to their detriment. 89
Plaintiffs alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and profes-
sional negligence. At trial, the jury instructions on the professional
negligence claim were in accord with the reasonable foreseeability
standard of International Mortgage.90 For the negligent misrepresen-
tation cause of action, however, instructions substantially similar to
the Restatement approach were given. They required that the ac-
countant have made representations with the "intent to induce plain-
tiff or a particular class of persons to which plaintiff belongs to rely on
[them]" to be liable.91 Based upon these instructions, the jury ruled in
determinative of the accountant's liability); International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225;
Hagen, supra note 6, at 78; Edward Brodsky, Liability of Accountants, N.Y.LJ. (Corporate
and Securities Litigation Section), Sept. 9, 1992, at 3.
86. 834 P.2d at 747-49.
87. For a fairly detailed account of the rise and fall of the Osborne Computer Com-
pany, see Bily, 834 P.2d at 747-49. The fall was due in part to the major presence of IBM
and other companies in the personal computer industry.
88. Arthur Young & Co. was a member of the exclusive "Big Eight" accounting firms.
Since the institution of the lawsuit, Arthur Young has merged with Ernst & Whinney and is
now called Ernst & Young. Ernst & Young is currently a member of the Big Six. For a list
of the other members of the Big Six, see supra note 31.
89. Bily, 834 P.2d at 747.
90. Id. at 748-49.
91. Id. at 749.
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favor of Arthur Young on the fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims, but found for the plaintiffs on the professional negligence
theory.92
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the theories of pro-
fessional negligence and negligent misrepresentation were treated
separately. With respect to professional negligence, the court en-
dorsed strict privity of the type found in Ultramares.93 The court held
that even intended beneficiaries cannot sue on general negligence
grounds because, in the absence of privity, the accountant owes no
duty to third parties.94 With respect to negligent misrepresentation,
however, the court approved of the Restatement approach.95 The
court went so far as to suggest a special jury instruction to be used in
negligent misrepresentation claims against accountants.96 The jury in-
struction emphasized the court's intent to narrowly define the class of
third parties who can recover from accountants. 97
A. Distinguishing Between Professional Negligence and Negligent
Misrepresentation
The California Supreme Court's distinction between professional
negligence and negligent misrepresentation is curious and perhaps un-
necessary. As the majority itself points out, courts and commentators
have not carefully distinguished between the theories of recovery in
the context of accountants' liability.98 Justice Kennard, in her dissent,
rejects the distinction between such factually similar theories of recov-
ery. 99 Kennard argues that "under these two liability theories, essen-
tially the same standard of care is applied to the same conduct by the
accountant."100
92. Id.
93. Id. at 767.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 769.
96. Id. at 773. The jury instruction reads, in relevant part:
Defendant is deemed to have intended to influence [its client's] transaction with
plaintiff whenever defendant knows with substantial certainty that plaintiff, or the
particular class of persons to which plaintiff belongs, will rely on the representa-
tion in the course of the transaction. If others become aware of the representa-
tion and act upon it, there is no liability even though defendant should reasonably
have foreseen such a possibility.
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 767-68; see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 142 (N.J. 1983)
(stating that "[tihough the theory advanced here by the plaintiffs is ... in the nature of
malpractice, their claim can be viewed as grounded in negligent misrepresentation").
99. Bily, 834 P.2d at 775-76 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 776.
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Indeed, in the context of liability suits against accountants there
seems to be no significant difference between professional negligence
and negligent misrepresentation. It is difficult to imagine a situation
in which a negligence suit against an accountant by a third party
would not be based upon representations made by the accountant
through an audit opinion. The very function of accountants that ex-
poses them to liability is not so much the negligent performance of the
audit, as it is the representations made regarding the results of the
audit. Therefore, third party complaints almost universally include
causes of action for professional negligence and negligent misrepre-
sentation. The privity requirement effectively forecloses third parties
from recovering under professional negligence, forcing plaintiffs to
rely upon the lower standard under negligent misrepresentation.
Thus, despite the court's separate treatment of professional negli-
gence and negligent misrepresentation, the practical result of the
court's decision is that third party recovery is based on the Restate-
ment approach.
Why did the court go to such lengths to establish the privity re-
quirement in professional negligence suits' 01 only to adopt the Re-
statement view in the context of negligent misrepresentation? As
written, the decision has the potential to lead to misinterpretations of
the court's ruling and confusion over the proper standard for third
party recovery.10 2 There are two probable reasons for the court's dis-
tinction between the two torts: (1) The court wanted to emphasize the
need for reliance on the audit opinion; and (2) The court, by thor-
oughly discussing privity, intended to prevent lower courts from ex-
panding the class of plaintiffs able to recover under negligent
misrepresentation.
With respect to the first reason, the distinction between the two
similar torts indicates the court's desire to emphasize the importance
of justifiable reliance on the audit report in a negligent misrepresenta-
tion action'0 3 and the need for the accountant to actually foresee that
the third party will rely upon her representation.' °4 The court stated
that "[b]ecause the audit report, not the audit itself, is the foundation
of the third person's claim, negligent misrepresentation more precisely
captures the gravamen of the cause of action."' 0 5 As opposed to pro-
fessional negligence, negligent misrepresentation depends on an ac-
101. The portion of the opinion discussing negligence and the privity requirement
spans approximately seven pages. Id. at 760-68.
102. See, e.g., Bill Ainsworth, Capitol Abuzz Over Accountants, RECORDER, Sept. 3,
1992, at 1 (reporting that the court adopted the privity rule in professional negligence
cases, with no mention of negligent misrepresentation or the Restatement approach).
103. Bily, 834 P.2d at 772.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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tual communication for liability to be imposed. Since a third party
action against an accountant is based on communications contained in
the audit opinion, the court preferred to discuss liability based upon
negligent misrepresentation.
The second reason for the court's distinction between the two
torts is the court's desire to limit the class of third parties who may
recover. By discussing privity in the professional negligence context,
the court intended to guide future decisions of the courts of appeal in
defining the class of third parties who may recover.10 6 The discussion
of privity in the professional negligence context may prevent lower
courts from expanding the class by explaining that the accountant ac-
tually foresees many more third parties than the court in Bily would
allow to recover.10 7
Whatever the purpose of the court's distinction between profes-
sional negligence and negligent misrepresentation, it is important to
realize that the court ultimately adopted the approach to third party
recovery as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and not the
Ultramares privity doctrine. 0 8
B. Public Policy Rationales
In Bily, the California Supreme Court advanced three main pub-
lic policy rationales in support of its abandonment of the reasonable
foreseeability standard: (1) the prospect of the accountant's liability
being disproportionate to her fault; (2) the ability of third parties to
engage in "private ordering"; and (3) the deleterious effects that lia-
bility to third parties would impose on auditors.10 9
In forwarding these rationales, the court referred to Biakanja v.
Irving, 10 a 1958 case in which the court held that a defendant's liabil-
ity to a third party depends on the consideration of public policy fac-
tors.' In Biakanja, the court listed the factors to be considered:
[1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of cer-
tainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the con-
nection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [5]
106. Bily, 834 P.2d at 767-74; see supra text accompanying note 105.
107. For an examination of arguments that the class of foreseen third parties is larger
than the court recognizes, see infra text accompanying notes 136-138.
108. In a more simple statement of its holding, the court wrote, "For the reasons stated
above, we have rejected the rule of International Mortgage Co. in favor of a negligent
misrepresentation rule substantially in accord with section 552 of the Restatement Second
of Torts." Bily, 834 P.2d at 774.
109. Id. at 761.
110. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
111. Id. at 19.
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the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and [6] the
policy of preventing future harm.112
The Biakanja court wanted such policy factors to be balanced against
each other in determining liability on a case-by-case basis.113 In Bily,
however, the policy factors were used in order to restrict the general
class of third parties as a justification for the rejection of reasonable
foreseeability." 4 In Bily the court focused on three of the Biakanja
policy factors, which will now be considered in turn.
(1) Disproportionate Liability
In Bily, the court stated, "Although the auditor's role in the fi-
nancial reporting process is secondary and the subject of complex pro-
fessional judgment, the liability it faces in a negligence suit by a third
party is primary and personal and can be massive."" 5 Relying on law
review commentary," 6 the court cited the accountant's lack of control
over the information on which the financial statements are based, and
the need for the accountant to exercise professional judgment in the
interpretation of broadly phrased professional standards." 7 The court
believed that these facts, coupled with what it assumed would be an
attenuated connection to the third party's injury," 8 would make the
accountant's liability disproportionate to her fault.
The court stated that the audit report is but one factor among
many that the investor will consider in making decisions because "rea-
sonable and prudent" investors will go beyond the audit report in veri-
fying the accuracy of financial statements." 9 Therefore, the court
reasoned, any injury to a third party is only remotely connected to the
accountant's negligence. 20
This reasoning fails to recognize the realities of the marketplace.
While it is certainly probable that an investor will consider a vast array
of criteria in determining whether to invest, including the market posi-
tion of the business, its management, and future prospects, it is overly
optimistic to assume that all investors, large and small, will investigate
112. Id. Following Biakanja, Missouri adopted a "balancing test" in which public pol-
icy factors determine the existence of a duty. Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co.,
493 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
113. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19 ("The determination whether in a specific case the de-
fendant will be held liable to a third person... is a matter of policy .....
114. Bily, 834 P.2d at 761:
115. Id. at 763.
116. The court cited Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic
Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. RFv. 1513 (1985), and John A. Siliciano, Negligent Ac-
counting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MicH. L. RFv. 1929 (1988).
117. Bily, 834 P.2d at 763.
118. Id. at 764.
119. Id. at 763.
120. Id.
November 1993]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the veracity of financial statements beyond an examination of the au-
dit opinion. 121 As Justice Wiener suggests, such considerations are
best left to the defense of comparative negligence. 122 Rather than ab-
solving accountants of all liability to third parties, a third party's rea-
sonable reliance on the accountant's audit might depend, in part, on
the level of business sophistication of the third party.'2
In addition, the court's concern regarding the accountant's lack of
control over the client's information and the need for professional
judgment overlooks the basis of the negligence action in the first
place. Liability of the accountant should be based on the improper
application of GAAP and GAAS, not whether the financial state-
ments are ultimately determined to be erroneous. 124 Control of the
client's information should not affect the accountant's ability to prop-
erly apply accounting standards. An accountant's liability can be de-
termined regardless of the state of the financial statements. If the
client is not forthcoming or is particularly evasive, or the accountant
suspects a problem with the financial statements, then the accountant
should not issue a positive opinion.
(2) Private Ordering
The second policy rationale on which the Bily court based its re-
jection of a reasonable foreseeability standard involves a third party's
ability to "privately order" the risk of an accountant's negligence. The
court explained that a third party has various options to protect itself,
including expending its own resources to verify the client's financial
data or contracting with the accountant who is issuing the opinion.'25
In support, the court referred to an article written by Professor
Siliciano in which he decried the expanding scope of accountant liabil-
121. See Mess, supra note 62, at 839.
122. Wiener, supra note 8, at 253.
123. Professor Siliciano, who generally argues against the reasonable foreseeability ap-
proach, nevertheless suggests "a stratified negligence rule that accounts for the varying
ability of third parties to implement their preferences through private ordering." Siliciano,
supra note 116, at 1974 n.210. As investor sophistication increases, so does the ability to
closely scrutinize the business entity's financial data and verify the accuracy of the account-
ant's opinion. This ability to "privately order" the risk of inaccurate financial statements
reduces the investor's reliance on the auditor, and therefore should reduce the auditor's
liability. Such a rule might draw support from the approach taken to determining whether
private offerings of securities are exempt from the securities laws. In SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), the Supreme Court looked at stock purchaser's access to
information in determining whether a stock offer was exempt from registration require-
ments. Id. at 126-27. If proportionate liability were to be adopted in auditor's liability
cases, as this Note proposes, then one factor to be considered in allocating liability should
be the level of sophistication of the plaintiffs who claim to have relied on the audit opinion.
124. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
125. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765.
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ity and advocated a more restrictive approach. 126 He argued that
third parties possess a level of sophistication that enables them to
commission their own audit, or have the corporation conduct an audit
specifically for them.127
Putting aside the problem of generalizing that all third parties
possess such a level of sophistication, 28 to require such private order-
ing would substantially reduce the efficiency of the investing and lend-
ing markets. As stated earlier in this Note, the unqualified opinion of
a reputable accountant in our modem economy is a condition prece-
dent to an investor accessing the various financial markets. 29 If the
opinion conducted for the client by its accountant cannot be relied
upon, then each individual investor or lender would have to conduct
its own costly audit. Such a requirement would substantially increase
the costs of lending or investing, and therefore borrowing or raising
capital. 130 Duplicitous auditing of an entity does not make much
sense and is not economically feasible to most third parties who con-
template investing or lending to corporate entities.
Professor Siliciano argues that, under the reasonable foreseeabil-
ity approach and without such private ordering, the accountant is in-
curring risk for which she is not compensated.' 3 ' Professor Siliciano
contends that since the accountant's bill is paid by the client, the fee
only compensates the accountant for the benefit received by the cli-
ent.132 Additional risk of exposure to relying third parties is not re-
flected in the fee because "the accountant often does not know the
extent to which the client will circulate the audit to third parties. '1 33
For this reason it is argued that accountants will not be able to charge
their clients for the additional exposure even if they can estimate
which third parties will rely. 34
The problem with this argument relates back to the nature of the
modem accounting industry. As Justice Wiener points out, account-
ing "fees have risen... with the accountant's increased sophistication,
126. Siliciano, supra note 116.
127. Id. at 1956.
128. See Mess, supra note 62, at 839.
129. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
130. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 785 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("[S]eparate audits by each
lender and investor, although no doubt a boon to the accounting profession, will result in a
socially wasteful duplication of effort and expense, resulting in disruption and delay of
business activity .... "); see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 150 (NJ. 1983)
(decrying "costly separate investigations by each party at interest... which are so much
sand in the economic machine").
131. Siliciano, supra note 116, at 1965.
132. 1&
133. I&
134. Id.
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and the complexity and risk associated with their endeavors."'135 In-
deed, the reliance by so many third parties on verification of financial
statements generates demand for the accountant's services. 136 As the
economy has become increasingly complex, the need for audited fi-
nancial statements by third parties has created a much larger market
for accounting services than was the case in 1931, when Ultramares
was decided. 137 This increased demand has logically led to an increase
in the earnings of accountants. 138 Thus, the aggregate earnings of ac-
countants have risen as a result of the increased risks created by in-
creased third party reliance.
To assert that accountants cannot charge individual clients addi-
tional fees based upon third party reliance ignores the reality that au-
diting fees have already risen in response to the demand created by
these third parties. This rise in demand has created a corresponding
increase in fees, which represents compensation for the increased reli-
ance on audit opinions. Accountants are therefore paid for the risks
that they undertake with respect to third parties.
(3) Effect of Imposition of Liability to Third Parties
The final public policy justification advanced by the Bily court in
rejecting reasonable foreseeability is a rebuttal to arguments that the
standard will encourage more careful audits. 139 The court suggested
that the nature of auditing is such that it is doubtful "whether audits
can be done in ways that would yield significantly greater accuracy
without disadvantages.'1 40
Again, this argument overlooks the nature of an action for negli-
gence. Liability will follow from a failure of the accountant to con-
form to the proper standard of care. In asserting that imposition of
liability to third parties will improve the accuracy of audits, propo-
nents of reasonable foreseeability are simply stating that accountants
have extra incentive to avoid falling below the established standard of
care. Indeed, the threat of liability is essential to counterbalance the
135. Wiener, supra note 8, at 250 (emphasis added).
136. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (N.J. 1983) (noting that de-
mand for audits is generated by stock exchanges, the SEC, institutional investors, invest-
ment specialists, stockholders, and lenders); see also Lawson & Mattison, supra note 7, at
1335.
137. See Mess, supra note 62, at 839 (quoting Arthur R. Wyatt, Auditors' Responsibili-
ties, 12 ST. Louis U. L.J. 331, 333 (1968) (noting that the emergence of the modern corpo-
ration, with increased reliance on outside capital, has created "a [new] consumer for their
reports beyond their direct client[s]")).
138. See Solomon, supra note 62, at 74 ("Obviously, the CPA is aware of [the] use of
his certificates and reports by 'the public' and takes this factor into consideration in billing
the client.").
139. Bily, 834 P.2d at 766.
140. Id.
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accountant's motivation to satisfy her client with an unqualified
opinion.141
The court also cites concerns that, faced with the prospect of lia-
bility to third parties, accounting firms will refuse to perform audits
for upstart, risky businesses.142 Although the auditor's liability should
result only from the improper application of GAAP and GAAS, 143
accounting firms may hesitate to audit companies when there is an
increased likelihood that litigation will ensue. Understandably, this
consequence would have a deleterious effect on the stimulation of the
economy.
However, neither limiting nor expanding accountant liability to
third parties represents a complete solution. If accountants are
shielded from third party liability, then investors and creditors might
have less confidence in the accuracy of the auditor's report: But the
additional expense of independent verification would impose the
same burdens on new businesses in attracting financial backing.
Either way, the potential for inaccurate financial statements will im-
pose a burden on new business ventures.
C. Reasonable Foreseeability Should Not Have Been Abandoned
The Restatement approach adopted by the California Supreme
Court in Bily does not go far enough in protecting third parties who
justifiably rely upon an accountant's representations. The critical dis-
tinction between the Restatement and the reasonable foreseeability
approaches is whether the accountant actually knew that the third
party would rely versus whether the accountant should have known.144
Courts and commentators have criticized this distinction as arbitrary
and based upon the subjective thoughts of the accountant. 145 Once
the decision is made to allow foreseen third parties to recover, it
seems inequitable to create "limited groups" of actually foreseen third
141. Id. at 780-82 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see also Mess, supra note 62, at 857
("[Pilacing greater responsibility for reports on the accountant, and increasing correspond-
ingly the independence and legal responsibility of the accountant, would increase the relia-
bility of the reports."); cf Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Accounting: Some
Economic Issues, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 1051, 1055 (1987) (granting that "an accounting firm
contemplating what to do when a client pressures it... might be deterred by the threat of
liability," but arguing that accountants will not be more careful if they feel they will be
sued regardless of their level of care).
142. Bily, 834 P.2d at 766.
143. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
144. Boveri & Marshall, supra note 10, at 291; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977).
145. Pace, supra note 25, at 444-48; Blue Bell Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
715 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
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parties, and to deny recovery to persons the accountant should have
foreseen. 146
Accountants actually foresee third party investors and creditors
to a far greater degree than the Restatement approach acknowledges.
The majority in Bily recognized this reality.147 Additionally, the
AICPA formally recognizes that the audit report is "a principal means
of communicating accounting information to those outside an enter-
prise.' 48 This being the case, it is difficult to assert that accountants
do not actually foresee that a wide variety of investors and creditors
may act in reliance on their representations. Thus, to draw a dividing
line around a "limited class" of third parties who may sue-those
whose reliance was subjectively foreseen by the accountant-is to
erect an artificial and unreasonable barrier.
The policy rationales advanced by the court in Bily do not justify
the abandonment of the reasonable foreseeability standard. The lack
of "empirical data" showing that liability creates incentives to exercise
proper professional care does not obviate the logical conclusion that
this is so.' 49 Further, private ordering is not feasible because it overes-
timates the sophistication of some third parties and unreasonably in-
hibits the flow of financial resources in modern capital markets.
While accountants may face liability disproportionate to their
fault in causing injury to third parties, the blanket restriction against
those parties whom the accountant actually knew would rely is far too
arbitrary and far too harsh a solution. Rather, looking at the measure
of damages in accountants' liability lawsuits provides a more equitable
remedy by providing third parties the right to recover while at the
same time protecting accountants from disproportionate liability.
146. Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291, 302 (Minn. 1976) ("Once it is admitted that a
certain number of people have been injured as a result of an accountant's malpractice,
there is no logical justification for denying any of them relief based upon the 'limited' or
'unlimited' nature of their 'class,' or whether the reliance of the particular injured parties
was or was not 'specifically' foreseeable."); see also Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt
& Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis. 1983); Pace, supra note 25, at 431-51.
147. Bily, 834 P.2d at 751 ("[A]udit reports are very frequently (if not almost univer-
sally) used by businesses to establish the financial credibility of their enterprises in the
perceptions of outside persons, e.g., existing and prospective investors, financial institu-
tions, and others who extend credit to an enterprise ...."). Some have argued that, even
under the privity approach, third parties should be able to recover as real parties in interest
because of the accountant's cognizance of their reliance. Solomon, supra note 62, at 74
(citing Note, Scope of Liability of a Negligent Report, 8 TEMP. L.Q. 404, 410 (1934)).
148. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board of the AICPA, No. 1, at 6-7 (1978).
149. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765.
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Ill. The Problem of Joint and Several Liability
Of all the public policy arguments against the reasonable foresee-
ability standard, the critical concern of the court is that accountants
are being held liable for damages out of proportion to their fault.150
Indeed, damage awards against accounting firms are reaching stagger-
ing levels.151 In 1992, for example, investors in a now-defunct com-
puter company, Miniscribe, Inc., were awarded a $568 million jury
verdict against Coopers & Lybrand, a Big Six accounting firm.' 5 2
Although the verdict was set aside and the firm settled for an undis-
closed amount, 5 3 the case illustrates the potential liability account-
ants face.
At the root of the problem is the doctrine of joint and several
liability.'5 4 In addition to the accounting firm, a plaintiff may have a
valid cause of action against a number of individuals and entities, such
as the corporation, its managers, and its officers. However, often the
corporation becomes bankrupt, and most of the other potential de-
fendants become judgment proof.' 55 As a result, the accounting firm
is left as the only remaining and financially viable target. Because
each individual tortfeasor may be held jointly and severally liable, the
accounting firm is often liable for all of the plaintiff's damages regard-
less of its degree of fault in relation to the other defendants. 5 6
Most commentators and courts have not specifically addressed
the effect of joint and several liability on accountants' liability to third
parties. However, most of the courts that have restricted such liability
150. Id. at 764. The court concluded that "disproportionate liability can not fairly be
justified on moral, ethical, or economic grounds." Id.
151. A report distributed by the Big Six accounting firms claims that in 1990 the firms
paid out an aggregate of $404 million in damages, equal to 7.7% of the firms' accounting
revenues. This amount increased in 1992 to $477 million, or 9% of revenues. Gail Diane
Cox, Unlimited Liability, NAT'L L.J, Dec. 21, 1992, at 1; see also Lee Berton, Price
Waterhouse Damage Award Fuels Industry's Campaign to Limit Liability, WALL ST. J., May
21, 1992, at A3.
152. The Year in Review: Tough Legal Battles Shaped Business World, NAT'L L.J, Dec.
28, 1992/Jan. 4, 1993, at S7.
153. Id.
154. See Brodsky, supra note 85, at 3.
155. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 763 (noting that in most accountant liability cases "[t]he
client, its promoters, and its managers have generally left the scene, headed in most cases
for government-supervised liquidation of the bankruptcy court"). Even Justice Wiener ac-
knowledges the "discomfort in saddling the merely negligent accountant with economic
responsibility for the fraud and dishonesty of the corporate manager." Wiener, supra note
8, at 258; see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 151 (NJ. 1983) (acknowledg-
ing that "in all likelihood the audited clients will be judgment proof or unable to satisfy
their share of the indebtedness due").
156. Mike Steenson, Recent Legislative Responses to the Rule of Joint and Several Lia-
bility, XXIII TORT & INS. L. 482, 488 (1988) (criticizing joint and several liability for
encouraging plaintiffs to seek out "deep pocket" defendants).
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center their concerns upon this issue.157 Judge Cardozo himself was
similarly concerned when he warned of "liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.' '1 58
Accounting firms, however, have not overlooked the joint and
several liability doctrine.159 The industry has decried joint and several
liability as a primary cause of their woes, and has rallied behind the
introduction of a bill in Congress that will replace joint and several
liability with proportionate liability in lawsuits brought under Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.160 The bill, the Securities
Private Enforcement Act, seeks to amend the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 to require that damages be measured under pro-
portional liability, unless the defendant in a private action is found to
have engaged in "knowing securities fraud.' 161 It provides that the
trier of fact in the suit shall determine the percentage of responsibility
of each party to the action, as well as the percentage of responsibility
of nonparties alleged to have contributed to the plaintiff's injury.162
The abrogation of joint and several liability would not be new to
California. In 1986, California voters approved Proposition 51, which
established proportional liability for cases in which noneconomic
damages are awarded. 63 The proposition was aimed at alleviating the
problem of city and local governments being targeted as "deep-
pocket" defendants in cases with large pain and suffering awards. 164
Such problems are strikingly analogous to the concerns expressed by
157. In Bily, the court repeatedly expressed its concern that accountants, as the sole
remaining solvent defendant, will be faced with claims for all of the damages incurred by
third parties. 834 P.2d at 763; see also Raritan River Steel v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d 609, 617
(N.C. 1988) (expressing concern over the "potential for inordinate liability"). In most
cases touching on the question of accountants liability to third parties, the audited entity is
bankrupt or otherwise judgment-proof and the accountants are left standing alone. See
Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So.2d 315, 315 (Miss. 1987) (audited
company went bankrupt); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d
110, 112 (N.Y. 1985) (same); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 443 (N.Y. 1931)
(same).
158. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 444 (Cardozo, J.).
159. The "Big Six" have claimed that "[t]he tort liability system in the United States is
out of control" and that joint and several liability encourages lawsuits targeted at them as
"deep-pocket defendants." Big Six Accounting Firms Launch Legal Attack, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 14, 1992, at 12. In fact, they contend that joint and several liability encourages "the
common [and egregious] practice of plaintiff's attorneys settling with the prime wrongdo-
ers.., at a fraction of what these parties should pay.., then pursu[ing] the case against the
'deep pocket' professionals." Id.
160. H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431.1-.5 (West Supp. 1993).
164. Barbara A. Allen et al., California's Proposition 51: Ambiguities in Apportion-
ment and the Impact on Federal Interpleader and Intra-State Settlement, 12 WHrrTTER L.
REV. 273, 279 (1991).
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the Bily court with respect to accountants. Current concerns over the
growing liability of accountants would be better addressed by adopt-
ing a similar stance in professional negligence suits.
Of course, the California Supreme Court has taken a strong
stance in favor of joint and several liability. In American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court,165 the court forcefully affirmed its support for
the doctrine. 166 The principle justification for joint and several liabil-
ity was that absent the doctrine, injured parties' ability to recover
would be seriously impaired. 167 However, such a rationale has no ap-
plication when the court has prevented injured plaintiffs from recover-
ing at all, as in Bily. To allow third parties to recover under
proportional liability is more equitable than to totally prohibit
recovery. 168
Such an approach applied to state negligence claims may go a
long way toward allaying fears of disproportionate liability in third
party lawsuits. Proportionate liability combined with a reasonable
foreseeability standard of third party recovery strikes a proper bal-
ance between the concerns of third parties and accountants. Deserv-
ing third parties would not be denied a remedy, as they are under the
privity and Restatement approaches, but accountants would not be
targeted as the "deep-pocket" defendants, as they might be under
joint and several liability. Because of the California Supreme Court's
strong stand in favor of joint and several liability in American Motor-
cycle, proposals favoring proportional liability would be most appro-
priately established through legislative enactment. 69
Conclusion
A large number of individuals and businesses other than the cli-
ent rely on the representations of accountants in modem society.
Businesses that expect to thrive and grow must demonstrate to a wide
variety of outsiders that their reported financial condition is true and
accurate. 70 In rejecting the Ultramares doctrine, courts have tried to
balance the need to recognize accountants' contemporary role in the
165. 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978).
166. Id. at 901-02.
167. Id. at 906.
168. Wiener, supra note 8, at 259 ("When imperfect justice is compared with no justice
at all, the law generally will select the former as being the lesser of two evils.").
169. In fact, almost immediately following the Bily decision, a short-lived attempt was
made to legislatively reverse the decision of the California Supreme Court. The attempt
was beaten back by accounting lobbyists on the technical basis that it was being attached to
a bill deemed unrelated in subject matter. See Ainsworth, supra note 102, at 10 ("[T]he
Senate agreed that accountant liability has little in common with mosquito abatement divi-
sions, and the bill was squashed.").
170. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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financial world with the need to protect them from liability that unrea-
sonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking.171 The Restate-
ment approach has often been advanced as striking such a balance. 172
However, by creating "limited groups" of third parties that account-
ants must have specifically foreseen would rely upon their representa-
tions, the approach erects artificial and unjustifiable barriers to third
parties who deserve to recover. Since accountants have such an im-
portant role in the financial community, the artificial privity require-
ment cannot stand because such strict limitations on which third
parties can sue are arbitrary and unnecessary. 173
Audited financial statements are largely, if not primarily, pre-
pared for third parties not in contractual privity with the auditor. 74
Accountants, third parties, and courts are aware of this reality. 75 The
fact that so many third parties need to rely on auditors' verification of
financial statements generates demand for the accountants' serv-
ices. 176 In view of this benefit, accountants should be liable for dam-
ages caused to third parties who have actually and reasonably relied
on their negligent work. Such liability should not be based on
whether accountants actually foresaw that third parties would rely,
but rather whether they should have foreseen the reliance. Arguably,
these are one in the same, since a modern accountant must foresee the
extent of the purposes for which an audit report may be used.
One valid concern is the rise of damage awards against account-
ants. Because the audited entity, often more at fault than anyone else,
is usually defunct, accountants become attractive targets as "deep-
pocket" defendants. 77 The doctrine of joint and several liability has
often worked to hold accountants liable for damages out of propor-
tion to their fault.178
This reasoning, however, does not provide a valid justification for
limiting the number of third parties who may sue defendants. Rather,
adoption of a proportional method of allocating damages among de-
fendants would strike a more equitable balance among the concerns
of third parties and accountants. Such a solution should be adopted
through legislative act, along with a reinstatement of the reasonable
foreseeability approach to the third party's ability to recover from ac-
171. See Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308, 1312 (N.H. 1982)
(emphasizing the need to "harmonize the accountant's contemporary role and his potential
liability").
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 136-138, 147-148 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
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countants. This solution gives deserving third parties a cause of action
against negligent accountants while protecting accountants against dis-
proportionate damage awards.

